Monday, April 14, 2008
A brief history of the U.S. housing market
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Going Green
However, hybrid cars are still costly. Even with gas averaging $3.28 a gallon nationally and 3 year new car loan rates at 7.11% given current differentials in terms of price and mpg, a hybrid Honda Civic is just barely less costly to buy and run than a Honda Civic sedan. And a decided disadvantage is that while given superior mileage the operating costs associated with a hybrid are far less than a regular car, the initial outlays and the monthly car payments one is commited to are far higher. To buy a greener car means that one must be willing to become less liquid (i.e. pay a higher amount out of pocket rather than finance the purchase, bring monthly payments down. This means having less cash on hand) or become more highly leveraged (commit to higher fixed expenses in the form of monthly car payments). Given current rates and the price differential on a hybrid versus a regular Honda Civic sedan this commitment boils down to agreeing to spend 50% more a month for the hybrid than the buyer of a regular but reasonably fuel efficient car is committed to pay. Government agencies or non-profits -with the public interest in mind- have shown themselves willing and able to sacrifice liquidity and increase their financial leverage in a way that private families and for-profit businesses understandably have not. (For example the city of Rock Island, Illinois has just purchased a fleet of twenty-one Honda Civic hybrids. Click here for more details.) Being greener in the case of hybrids means being drier (less liquid) or more precariously positioned (more highly leveraged)
Tuesday, March 04, 2008
Thoughts on social entrepreneurship
How profitable can for-benefit companies be? It is a matter of basic microeconomic theory that any organization that on the one hand seeks to earn profits but on the other is focused on not only its own profits but is also concerned with the impact of its actions on other people and the planet will tend to either earn less profit than it would otherwise enjoy or it has to pay its staff less than they could make elsewhere. Why? Concerned with a "triple bottom line" such a company is trying to internalize benefits that it will not be compensated for or is trying to internalize costs that it would not otherwise have to bear. It can be shown that either way profits earned will be less than what they would be if the company were instead concerned only with its own profits.
In a market in which funding will only flow to such a company if it pays a competitive rate of return this means that it will have to rely on its staff willingly taking a cut in pay or relying on volunteers to help. Barring this the fact is that investors in a social enterprise will have to be willing to accept less return with greater risk than they would have to elsewhere. In reality of course what we increasingly see is a combination of all three of these things, also included in this mix are grants and subsidized credit that brings the average cost of capital down while appearing to pay private investors a favorable return. By bringing together dedicated staff ,volunteers, and investors social enterprises can reduce their dependence on grants, gifts, and subsidized credit from chariable organizations and governments but in reality dedication and commitment are both necessary ingredients in the process.
For example consider the following scenario. Management realizes that the more labor it employs and the higher its scale of operations the better it will be for other businesses in its area. This could be because of the knowledge that spillovers from its workers to employees of other companies operating in the area. This could be because this company supplies an input that will then be regularly supplied in the local market. The point is that with a view toward the social benefits of its actions this firm will push its level of operations well beyond the level it would if only concerned with short-run maximization of its own profits. Arguably, the long-run profitability of this firm may be increased if the productivity of labor employed by other firms is increased significantly but the fact remains that this social enterprise's short-term profits will suffer.
Assuming that it would have only earned normal profits as a for-profit then by producing more than the profit maximizing level of output it generates negative economic profits. In an accounting sense the books may more than balance, the firm may appear to be profitable but this is only because either stakeholders or staff are willing to accept a lower return (in exchange for knowing that what they have done is of benefit to others) or because grants, subsidized credit, gifts, or volunteers are able to make-up the difference between the accounting profits realized and the economic profits required of a for-profit enterprise.
The Grameen Bank is an example of such an organization. Working with a dedicated staff that could be earning far more elsewhere 22% of every dollar lent comes from donations or the Central Bank of Bangladesh. This is not to be viewed as a failing of the Grameen Bank but rather simple comfirmation of the fact that it is impossible for a firm to either consider costs that it would not otherwise have to bear or consider benefits in making its decisions that it will not receive any direct or immediate compensation for without seeing its short-run profits fall*.
*In the late 1990s Richard Sandor helped to establish the Chicago Climate Exchange (the CCX) in which CO2 emission rights are traded on the private market. The CCX also manages the much more important ECX (the European Climate Exchange). Although enormously profitable at this point the CCX was formed in the late 1990s with the help of a $1.1 million grant from the Joyce Foundation. Sandor is also the father of the interest rate futures market. A question naturally arises as to how much grant money had to be provided to form interest rate futures trading in the 1970s compared to the $1.1 million used to organize the CCX.
The catalysts to growth in social enterprises.
Imagine a Venn diagram with three circles drawn on it. The first is labeled need, the second staffing, and the third, financing. Given growing population and the push worldwide toward industrialization the need circle is growing ever larger each year. The growth in population corresponds to a rising number of people living in absolute poverty while rising population and industrialization together mean growing pressure on the environment. Growth in accumulated wealth, in the stock of human capital, and in the supply of labor mean that the staffing and funding circles are growing as well. This growth in all three circles means that inevitably the degree of overlap should grow over time but there is also at play a shifting of the staffing and funding circles toward the much larger and faster growing need circle as attitudes change and more people become aware of the extent and severity of problems the world's poor and, via the environment, future generations face.
There was serious flooding toward the end of summer of 2007 in Bangladesh, India and Nepal. Former President Bill Clinton appeared on the Oprah Winfrey show early last fall to promote his book Giving and featured the microfinance institution Kiva. In response to the crisis in South Asia one could easily go online and donate money to aid flood victims in South Asia. After hearing of Kiva on the Oprah Winfrey show anyone interested in becoming a lender to someone in any number of developing countries could do so with only a bit of time, a bit of money, an internet connection, and a valid credit card. Computer technology has made it easier to not only learn of problems around the world but also to act on such problems. One hears of the Skoll Foundation on social enterpreneurship, One World Health, Living Goods, Better World Books, Vikram Akula's microfinance organization SKS and within minutes finds the home pages for these organizations, praise and criticism, and discussion of related organization. There is no question that a large part of the growth in activity, refered to above the shifting of staffing and funding circles toward the needs circle as all three grow ever larger, is in part due to the ease with which information can be obtained and action taken. In particular, the flow of funding that as Wei-Skillern et al in their book Entrepreneurship in the Social Sector characterize as highly fragmented (p. 13) has become far less so thanks to the internet.
Arguably another factor in addition to the ease of funding is that both in terms of funding and staffing there are a growing number of upper-middle class and wealthy people whose knowledge of the world is quite a bit broader than their parents and grandparents. They also increasingly are searching for some meaning in their own lives, are conscious at some level of their good fortune and wish to share it rather than hoard it. The growth of modern cities allowed a shift from the street-alley segregation (where although separate the wealthy and the poor lived in proximity to each other) that Stuart M Blumen refers to in his book the Emergence of the Middle Class to areal segregation (where the middle class and wealthier segments of society could and do live largely separate lives). In a very interesting way perhaps modern media has created a virtual world where it is far more difficult to grow up shielded and largely unaware of the problems of others and the environment and has helped move us back toward a time where it was harder to ignore the plight and misfortune of others.
The need for social enterprises.
As laudible as social enterprises are it is an important question whether or not these needs couldn't be far better served by government. Herman Daly has long advocated that government set the stage for the private sector by insuring, prior to market activity, that what he refers to as intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity are taken into account. In a world in which historical accident is relevant (such as England's endowments of coal, iron ore, and water transport in the age of coal and steam or our own endowments in the U.S. of coal, iron-ore, oil, and water transport in the age of steel) and in which the scale of activity has risen so much relative to its resource base (as in populous areas throughout the premodern period or the industrialized world now) attention must be paid not only to efficiency but to justice as well. The faster a society pushes use of renewable resources beyond their sustainable limits and the faster it depletes its stock of nonrenewable resources the more future generations are liable to suffer and the less equitable the allocation of natural resources will be over time. The more economies allocate resources of all sorts to the satisfaction of the relatively trivial needs of economically better off consumers and businesses rather than the abolutely basic needs of the poor the less equitable the allocation of resources will be at the present time. Social entrepreneurs, by definition, seek to promote a more equitable allocation of effort both now and in the future or in short, doing what Daly has long advocated sovereign governments should be doing. The question therefore arises whether or not social enterprises are not only growing because it has become easier to become informed of where needs are and to organize the resources needed to affect change but also because of an increasing awareness of how far short of the mark governments have been in taking the initiative and following through. Indeed Kaushik Basu in his Prelude to Political Economy identifies clearly how easily recommendations given to politicians by experts can be expected to be completely ignored (see chapter 7 of Basu's Prelude pp. 169-173).
Because of their ability to act without having to navigate choppy political waters, to act without having to divine the preferences of politicians, to act without having to try to persuade them of the value of a given program, or to act without having to enlist the support of others to persuade policy makers, social enterprises are far better at initiating change than governments can be. Ironically they are inherently inferior to government in being able to sustain a certain level of activity or to achieve a sufficiently high enough scale. No small part of the limited ability to sustain effort over time is because it is difficult for social enterprises to capture the benefits generated by programs they've initiated as easily as governments can. For example, one might envision a social enterprise in which schooling is provided to elementary age students along with a stipend to cover the loss of income the family suffers as their children attend school rather than work. If this important work was carried out on a wide enough scale by the state the stock of human capital might grow. In turn, the level of output per worker would grow, and given current capital labor ratios, the expanded real per capita income would generate increased tax revenues and therefore be a self-liquidating investment. In contrast it is hard to imagine a patch work of social enterprises working independently that could offer similar opportunities on a wide enough scale to make much of a dent in the problem in a short enough period of time. It is equally hard to imagine their capturing the benefits that accrue only with a lag to other businesses in terms of more easily trained, more flexible, and therefore more productive workers. In short, there are places where social enterpreneurs will be able to step in but many others where benefits are either delayed or shared by the community at large in which they will not be able to step in as easily.
The other major drawback to social entrepreneurship is that it is difficult for social enterprises to achieve the sort of scale needed to really bring about change. Primarily this is due to the continual need to find staff and those willing to provide financial support who will readily take on added risk or responsibility for lower returns in the numbers required to keep up with the growing needs of the world economy for help.
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
All true but largely beside the point.
Friday, November 02, 2007
Taking stock of financial markets and the FED
Friday, October 12, 2007
Inequality Rises in the U.S.
Sunday, October 07, 2007
on market falure, game theory, and government policy
Why better safe than sorry rather than nothing ventured nothing gained? There are of course many transactions which are small and routine and the potential costs of mistakes are therefore small. Here one can experiment. One needn't rely on trust or extensive experience. Say that I spend $1 to buy new brand of cola rather than Coke. I discover that I don’t like it nearly as much as I do Coke. The next opportunity I have I will simply remember to buy Coke rather than the new brand and my loss, the cost of my mistake, is at most the $1 spent. However, there are many transactions that are infrequent and that are far from routine. Basically whenever it is the case that a transaction is large (large from the perspective of the individual involved) and, at least at first, the transaction is far from routine the costs of making a mistake are quite high. We see people hesitate for this reason. Whether a given choice has been a wise or a foolish choice hinges crucially on what others do. Your assessment of the wisdom or folly of a particular decision then hinges crucially on what you think others will do. Before deciding to reenter the bond and stock market (and to therefore begin to take greater risks again) in the wake of a bear market, a financial investor must be confident that others will soon begin to feel bullish as well . In an economy where, even with education, jobs opportunities are scarce, a poor family sending their children to school (and in the process foregoing the income they would otherwise help bring in depends on) hinges on being confident that jobs will be there. Residents living in the vast slum of Dharavi in Mumbai agreeing to move into smaller living spaces, doing their handicraft work in the centralized location promised, hinges crucially on their being confident that the promised work space will materialize. In all of these cases resistance to change is far from irrational. The costs of mistakes are so great and the decision to heavily invest in bonds, to take years out of one’s earning life for education , or to agree to move if markets remain bearish, job opportunities scarce, or promises are not kept impose costs too great to absorb. Game theory. Game theory focuses on such situations.* In the classic prisoner’s dilemma criminals face potentially tremendous costs. To minimize the damage that might occur to them individually they confess rather than stay quiet. A socially efficient decision (from the standpoint of this society of two criminals at least) would be to keep quiet. However not knowing what the other prisoner is doing to do, the equilibrium solution is to confess. Both do so and both are far worse off than they would have been if they had just kept quiet. The reason they don’t is in part because they do not know what the other will do. However, the choice made is more importantly due to the fact that they make this decision only once, and that the costs of mistakes are very high indeed. Contrary to the typical examples of market efficiency in a prisoner's dilemma rational self-interest leads to socially poor results. If you keep the same fundamental structure of a prisoner’s dilemma (choices/decisions are not small routine ones and where mistakes are relatively expensive and are not quickly or easily corrected) but alter the payoffs in such a way that the actions of decision makers (players of the game) are complementary you move from a prisoner’s dilemma to what are called coordination games.** To say that the payoffs are complementary means that they are very much contingent on what others do. Good or bad, decisions reinforce one another. If we are able and willing to take risks and are fairly confident that others will act in such a way that their choices positively reinforce our actions then we will go ahead. If we are not confident of this, it is better to wait.
In classic examples of market efficiency, no one need think strategically at all and the environment is truly a competitive one in which the gains of some are offset by the losses of others. We do not have to think strategically because the costs of mistakes are so small. In a prisoner’s dilemma we think strategically at first but ultimately decide that regardless of what others might do it is best for us to protect ourselves whatever might be the long-run costs to society and to ourselves. In a coordination game , we think strategically throughout and must trust others to act in a certain way before we are willing to move in a positive direction. Unless confident of what others may do, their actions materially altering the payoffs of our taking on greater risks, we are better safe than sorry. Nothing ventured nothing gained is too dangerous a philosophy for us to follow. Understanding the obstacles to forward movement government can act as a catalyst to decisions taken by private citizens and businesses and can improve on market outcomes. In the process the payoffs change in such a way that sellers’ costs, the prices buyers must pay, the uncertainty of markets materializing and the contingency of individual decisions are reduced. President Clinton’s Aids/HIV initiative can be viewed in this light. With private donations and government grants he provided a guarantee to drug companies that if they were to ramp up production and, in so doing, realize large enough economies of scale to lower costs demand would be sufficient to absorb the added production. The guaranteed demand was made possible though the Clinton foundation support that supplemented recipient countries’ funding. By guaranteeing a market President Clinton broke the deadlock that otherwise would have gone on for far longer. *The late British economist G.L.S. Shackle wrote of "crucial experiments" which by their very nature are nonroutine and potentially very costly if they fail. Although I am not aware of anyone doing so, one might draw a direct link between Shackle's crucial experiments and nonrepeated games. Also, in mainstream economic theory, there is Christina Romer's irreversibility hypothesis -that decision makers confronted with uncertain situations rationally will delay committing to making any decision and spending when such commitments are costly to reverse. (see " Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment" Pindyck,Robert S., Journal of Economic Literature, 1991, 29, 3, 1110-1148 and "Uncertainty as a Propagating Force in The Great Depression" Ferderer,J.Peter; Zalewski,David A., The Journal of Economic History, 1994, 54, 4, 825-849) For more on coordination games see "Coordination" by C. Monica Capra and Charles A. Holt Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Jan., 1999), pp. 630-636 or Debraj Ray, Development Economics, Princeton University Press.
Friday, September 28, 2007
sanitation in india
Two important differences between modern India and urban 19th century America and western Europe:
The provision of clean water and sewer connections was not remarkably fast in the now indistrialized world (see for example, Martin Melosi's _The Sanitary City_) There are two things that make India's current situation different from western Europe or America's in the 19th century however that have made progress even slower in India and in other economically developing countries. The first has to do with the medical advances that have taken place between the 19th century and now. The second is the sheer size of the problem India faces now now versus what America and western Europe had to deal with a century and a half ago.
Modern medicine has made it possible for economically privileged families to protect themselves without having to worry as much about the poor and their situation. In contrast to 19th century America and western Europe, middle class and wealthier families can insulate themselves fairly effectively against diseases such as cholera and dysentary. Abram De Swaan in his book _In the Care of the State_ details how even as more properous families located in suburban areas with new construction and water and sewer lines they could not completely protect themselves from diseases spread from the poorer sections of 19th century America and Europe. Also with greater numbers of poor people crowded into urban areas it was more and more likely that dieseases such as cholera would break out and spread from poorer areas to wealthier ones. Before antibiotics, other advances in medical care, and insecticides weighing the threat of diseases spreading to wealthier neighborhoods against the added costs of extending water and sewer lines to poor neighborhoods, the calculus of enlightened self-interest tipped the scales in favor of the poor (see Abram De Swaan, pp. 137-142). In modern India the costs and the benefits have changed radically. Poor areas are incredibly congested and therefore very difficult (i.e. costly) to connect to existing water and sewer lines. At the same time and more importantly, the direct benefits to wealthier families of such measures are far less thanks to modern medicine which better protects them against the threat of diseases originating in poorer areas.* *Susan Chaplin in her article "Cities, Sewers and Poverty: India's Politics of Sanitation" (environment and Urbanization, 1999, pp. 145-158) clearly notes this "...the very developlements in modern medicine and civil engineering that contributed to the success of sanitation/ public health in nineteenth century Britain have enabled the middle class to largely ignore environmental problems and the resulting diseases. The use of antibiotics and insecticides have generally contained potential epidemics in slum areas, and hence have not generated a mutual awareness amoung the middle-class that it would be in the interests of society as a whole if the poor were provided with decent living conditions" (Chaplin, p. 151) The congestion and the resultant costs of dealing with sanitation issues are in part a function of much higher rates of increase in numbers and therefore a much larger scale problem to be dealt with. Mira Kamdar in _Planet India_ notes that urban India grows by 10 million people a year. and in Calcutta, The Living City, volume 2 it is noted that Mumbai saw its population increase by 1000 people per day through migration. (Although these numbers are out of date one can imagine the problem is even worse today). America and western Europe had much smaller numbers to deal with during their periods of substantial urban growth. Other factors: A great degree of India's failure to conquer the problems of sanitation and clean water are therefore arguably due to the these two factors. Other factors of course are at play as well. There is the fear on the part of municipal authorities that if in they take measures to improve the living conditions of the poor that this will simply attract more poor migrants to them. There is a Harris-Todaro like argument implicit in this that therefore improvements will be short-lived. As conditions in city A improve a larger fraction of those migrants who might have moved to city B will move instead to A, overtaxing its capacity to serve them and pushing living conditions back to where they were before. The initially cleaner city is ultimately no better off than it was before. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that piecemeal efforts to effect change are far less likely to achieve success than coordinated concerted effort on at least a regional if not national front. There is also the fact that many slum areas are occupied by squatters. The fear is that extending proper water and sanitation will legitimize squatters' claims to these lands. Often large slums are located in what are considered areas of prime real estate (currently Dharavi in Mumbai and the Salt Lake area in Kolkata years ago as well.). As an area becomes more and more settled real estate developers must realize that it will be far more difficult for the state to remove and relocate slum dwellers from these areas on their behalf. (see pages 14-15 of Burra, Patel and Kerr, "Community Designed, built and Managed Toilet Blocks in Indian Cities" Environment and Urbanization, 2003, pp. 11-32) The great predicament is that if the Alliance (SPARC, the National Slum Dwellers Federation, and Mahila Milan) estimates are correct and a 10 seat toilet block will serve 500 people in an area are realtively low cost ($800 U.S. to build a well-designed 10 seat toilet block with pour-flush systems) the fact remains that to tackle this problem requires massive expenditures. For example, in Mumbai almost 2000 such blocks would need to be built to cover slum dwellers who, as of now, haven't access to proper facilities at all. Using the official exchange rate, the total costs would therefore be over one and a half million dollars U.S. (and in terms of purchasing power parity almost $8 million U.S.). Regardless of the cost, management of various charities and NGOs of 2000 such projects along with the competition for money as these organizations work independently of one another implies a high degree of inefficiency. Yet along with the decided apathy that exists due to government focusing mostly on the interests of the well-to-do and the powerful there is the issue of government inefficiency. Burra, Patel, and Kerr make a strong case for being more than a bit skeptical about the ability of municipal governments being at all efficient. One Alliance study cited in their article shows that contractors have routinely built substandard toilet blocks.** Inadequate water supplies in particular mean that often in as little as three months latrines become so blocked and dirty that they become unusable. This couple with builders asking community members for more money as toilet blocks are being built in their neighborhoods and the city charging unrealistically high fees for access (Rs150 for a family of five would allow each family member to use the facilities once a day) suggests that perhaps community based initiatives, given political realities, are on balance a better alternative. ** See Robert Wade_Governing the Market_ pages 288-289. Contrasting corruption in Taiwan to corruption in India he notes that in East Asia: "Most rumored or reported corruption takes place at the local and provincial government levels where nothing major for the national development effort is at stake ... In all these ways corruption contrasts with corruption in many other countries in South and Southeast Asia. Corruption on public works projects, for example, occurs mainly through overcharging for correctly built structures. In India it occurs mainly by substandard construction of correctly priced structures, which are much more likely to wash out in the next monsoon. Taiwan's mode is probably less damaging to economic development than India's".Thursday, September 27, 2007
More public support for higher education
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
The G.I. Bill
Friday, September 14, 2007
socioeconomic standing and access to higher education
He outlines several very recent programs at flagship public universities such as UVA, the University of Texas, and UNC-Chapel Hill to increase enrollment of students from low-income families as well as very recent efforts by Princeton (1998), Harvard (2005), and Yale (2006) to increase enrollment rates and graduation rates of students from low-income families. Very selective schools by definition admit and graduate mostly students from wealthier families. Hill, Winston, and Boyd ("Affordability: Family Incomes and Net Prices at Highly Selective Private Colleges and Universities" Journal of Human Resources, 40 (fall 2005)) note that 108,721 students earned undergraduate degrees at the 28 highly selective private colleges and universities in their study. This implies that well under 10% of all the students earning bachelor's degrees in spring of 2002 received their degrees from such schools. Given the cost of attending such institutions, one can safely assume that families of relatively modest means were receiving some sort of financial aid. Assuming that all middle class and low-income families attending these schools received some kind of aid, students from families earning less than $51,000 a year represented only 17% of students graduating from such schools.
To make these very exclusive schools more inclusive is fine. However, students from wealthy families are disproportionately represented in these schools and always will be. Besides this, as noted above only a small percent of college graduates in a given year earn their degrees from such institutions. Therefore changes here cannot be expected to create more than a ripple overall. What is needed are similar programs at the colleges and universities where the majority of students pursue their education. However as Ehrenberg points out there is a danger in such institutions being more inclusive because these "lesser" colleges and universities face even more risk -both financially and politically- if they follow suit.
The financial resources of such schools are far more limited. As Hill,Winston, and Boyd (in the study of highly selective private colleges and universities already mentioned above) note there is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the net price students from low-income families are asked to pay for their schooling and the size of the endowment per student a particular school has. In the case of schools with much lower endowments per student Ehrenberg notes that they "...do not have the large flow of annual giving and the large endowments that the University of Virginia or the University of Chapel Hill have and thus it will be more difficult for them to develop the resources necessary to support programs such as Access UVA or the Carolina Covenant."
He goes on to point out that "If these flagship institutions are successful in diversifying their student bodies along racial/ethnic and socioeconomic lines, they run the risk of alienating the traditional supporters of their institutions; the upper and middle class families whose children attend high school that have been large feeders schools for them. This may translate into political pressure to reverse policies that led to the diversification, or a further loss of financial support for the public institutions." (Ehrenberg, p. 14). Other schools face the same political problem if students from the families that have typically supported these schools have a more difficult time being admitted into these schools because equally or more deserving students from poorer families have taken their place.
Therefore the current efforts that are being made to make access to higher education more equitable are likely to have less impact than one would hope for or what is needed to really change the way opportunity is distributed. A few cards in the deck are being moved around and most of the aces are still at the top. The entire deck needs to be reshuffled.