Tuesday, December 11, 2007
All true but largely beside the point.
Friday, November 02, 2007
Taking stock of financial markets and the FED
Friday, October 12, 2007
Inequality Rises in the U.S.
Sunday, October 07, 2007
on market falure, game theory, and government policy
Why better safe than sorry rather than nothing ventured nothing gained? There are of course many transactions which are small and routine and the potential costs of mistakes are therefore small. Here one can experiment. One needn't rely on trust or extensive experience. Say that I spend $1 to buy new brand of cola rather than Coke. I discover that I don’t like it nearly as much as I do Coke. The next opportunity I have I will simply remember to buy Coke rather than the new brand and my loss, the cost of my mistake, is at most the $1 spent. However, there are many transactions that are infrequent and that are far from routine. Basically whenever it is the case that a transaction is large (large from the perspective of the individual involved) and, at least at first, the transaction is far from routine the costs of making a mistake are quite high. We see people hesitate for this reason. Whether a given choice has been a wise or a foolish choice hinges crucially on what others do. Your assessment of the wisdom or folly of a particular decision then hinges crucially on what you think others will do. Before deciding to reenter the bond and stock market (and to therefore begin to take greater risks again) in the wake of a bear market, a financial investor must be confident that others will soon begin to feel bullish as well . In an economy where, even with education, jobs opportunities are scarce, a poor family sending their children to school (and in the process foregoing the income they would otherwise help bring in depends on) hinges on being confident that jobs will be there. Residents living in the vast slum of Dharavi in Mumbai agreeing to move into smaller living spaces, doing their handicraft work in the centralized location promised, hinges crucially on their being confident that the promised work space will materialize. In all of these cases resistance to change is far from irrational. The costs of mistakes are so great and the decision to heavily invest in bonds, to take years out of one’s earning life for education , or to agree to move if markets remain bearish, job opportunities scarce, or promises are not kept impose costs too great to absorb. Game theory. Game theory focuses on such situations.* In the classic prisoner’s dilemma criminals face potentially tremendous costs. To minimize the damage that might occur to them individually they confess rather than stay quiet. A socially efficient decision (from the standpoint of this society of two criminals at least) would be to keep quiet. However not knowing what the other prisoner is doing to do, the equilibrium solution is to confess. Both do so and both are far worse off than they would have been if they had just kept quiet. The reason they don’t is in part because they do not know what the other will do. However, the choice made is more importantly due to the fact that they make this decision only once, and that the costs of mistakes are very high indeed. Contrary to the typical examples of market efficiency in a prisoner's dilemma rational self-interest leads to socially poor results. If you keep the same fundamental structure of a prisoner’s dilemma (choices/decisions are not small routine ones and where mistakes are relatively expensive and are not quickly or easily corrected) but alter the payoffs in such a way that the actions of decision makers (players of the game) are complementary you move from a prisoner’s dilemma to what are called coordination games.** To say that the payoffs are complementary means that they are very much contingent on what others do. Good or bad, decisions reinforce one another. If we are able and willing to take risks and are fairly confident that others will act in such a way that their choices positively reinforce our actions then we will go ahead. If we are not confident of this, it is better to wait.
In classic examples of market efficiency, no one need think strategically at all and the environment is truly a competitive one in which the gains of some are offset by the losses of others. We do not have to think strategically because the costs of mistakes are so small. In a prisoner’s dilemma we think strategically at first but ultimately decide that regardless of what others might do it is best for us to protect ourselves whatever might be the long-run costs to society and to ourselves. In a coordination game , we think strategically throughout and must trust others to act in a certain way before we are willing to move in a positive direction. Unless confident of what others may do, their actions materially altering the payoffs of our taking on greater risks, we are better safe than sorry. Nothing ventured nothing gained is too dangerous a philosophy for us to follow. Understanding the obstacles to forward movement government can act as a catalyst to decisions taken by private citizens and businesses and can improve on market outcomes. In the process the payoffs change in such a way that sellers’ costs, the prices buyers must pay, the uncertainty of markets materializing and the contingency of individual decisions are reduced. President Clinton’s Aids/HIV initiative can be viewed in this light. With private donations and government grants he provided a guarantee to drug companies that if they were to ramp up production and, in so doing, realize large enough economies of scale to lower costs demand would be sufficient to absorb the added production. The guaranteed demand was made possible though the Clinton foundation support that supplemented recipient countries’ funding. By guaranteeing a market President Clinton broke the deadlock that otherwise would have gone on for far longer. *The late British economist G.L.S. Shackle wrote of "crucial experiments" which by their very nature are nonroutine and potentially very costly if they fail. Although I am not aware of anyone doing so, one might draw a direct link between Shackle's crucial experiments and nonrepeated games. Also, in mainstream economic theory, there is Christina Romer's irreversibility hypothesis -that decision makers confronted with uncertain situations rationally will delay committing to making any decision and spending when such commitments are costly to reverse. (see " Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment" Pindyck,Robert S., Journal of Economic Literature, 1991, 29, 3, 1110-1148 and "Uncertainty as a Propagating Force in The Great Depression" Ferderer,J.Peter; Zalewski,David A., The Journal of Economic History, 1994, 54, 4, 825-849) For more on coordination games see "Coordination" by C. Monica Capra and Charles A. Holt Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Jan., 1999), pp. 630-636 or Debraj Ray, Development Economics, Princeton University Press.
Friday, September 28, 2007
sanitation in india
Two important differences between modern India and urban 19th century America and western Europe:
The provision of clean water and sewer connections was not remarkably fast in the now indistrialized world (see for example, Martin Melosi's _The Sanitary City_) There are two things that make India's current situation different from western Europe or America's in the 19th century however that have made progress even slower in India and in other economically developing countries. The first has to do with the medical advances that have taken place between the 19th century and now. The second is the sheer size of the problem India faces now now versus what America and western Europe had to deal with a century and a half ago.
Modern medicine has made it possible for economically privileged families to protect themselves without having to worry as much about the poor and their situation. In contrast to 19th century America and western Europe, middle class and wealthier families can insulate themselves fairly effectively against diseases such as cholera and dysentary. Abram De Swaan in his book _In the Care of the State_ details how even as more properous families located in suburban areas with new construction and water and sewer lines they could not completely protect themselves from diseases spread from the poorer sections of 19th century America and Europe. Also with greater numbers of poor people crowded into urban areas it was more and more likely that dieseases such as cholera would break out and spread from poorer areas to wealthier ones. Before antibiotics, other advances in medical care, and insecticides weighing the threat of diseases spreading to wealthier neighborhoods against the added costs of extending water and sewer lines to poor neighborhoods, the calculus of enlightened self-interest tipped the scales in favor of the poor (see Abram De Swaan, pp. 137-142). In modern India the costs and the benefits have changed radically. Poor areas are incredibly congested and therefore very difficult (i.e. costly) to connect to existing water and sewer lines. At the same time and more importantly, the direct benefits to wealthier families of such measures are far less thanks to modern medicine which better protects them against the threat of diseases originating in poorer areas.* *Susan Chaplin in her article "Cities, Sewers and Poverty: India's Politics of Sanitation" (environment and Urbanization, 1999, pp. 145-158) clearly notes this "...the very developlements in modern medicine and civil engineering that contributed to the success of sanitation/ public health in nineteenth century Britain have enabled the middle class to largely ignore environmental problems and the resulting diseases. The use of antibiotics and insecticides have generally contained potential epidemics in slum areas, and hence have not generated a mutual awareness amoung the middle-class that it would be in the interests of society as a whole if the poor were provided with decent living conditions" (Chaplin, p. 151) The congestion and the resultant costs of dealing with sanitation issues are in part a function of much higher rates of increase in numbers and therefore a much larger scale problem to be dealt with. Mira Kamdar in _Planet India_ notes that urban India grows by 10 million people a year. and in Calcutta, The Living City, volume 2 it is noted that Mumbai saw its population increase by 1000 people per day through migration. (Although these numbers are out of date one can imagine the problem is even worse today). America and western Europe had much smaller numbers to deal with during their periods of substantial urban growth. Other factors: A great degree of India's failure to conquer the problems of sanitation and clean water are therefore arguably due to the these two factors. Other factors of course are at play as well. There is the fear on the part of municipal authorities that if in they take measures to improve the living conditions of the poor that this will simply attract more poor migrants to them. There is a Harris-Todaro like argument implicit in this that therefore improvements will be short-lived. As conditions in city A improve a larger fraction of those migrants who might have moved to city B will move instead to A, overtaxing its capacity to serve them and pushing living conditions back to where they were before. The initially cleaner city is ultimately no better off than it was before. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that piecemeal efforts to effect change are far less likely to achieve success than coordinated concerted effort on at least a regional if not national front. There is also the fact that many slum areas are occupied by squatters. The fear is that extending proper water and sanitation will legitimize squatters' claims to these lands. Often large slums are located in what are considered areas of prime real estate (currently Dharavi in Mumbai and the Salt Lake area in Kolkata years ago as well.). As an area becomes more and more settled real estate developers must realize that it will be far more difficult for the state to remove and relocate slum dwellers from these areas on their behalf. (see pages 14-15 of Burra, Patel and Kerr, "Community Designed, built and Managed Toilet Blocks in Indian Cities" Environment and Urbanization, 2003, pp. 11-32) The great predicament is that if the Alliance (SPARC, the National Slum Dwellers Federation, and Mahila Milan) estimates are correct and a 10 seat toilet block will serve 500 people in an area are realtively low cost ($800 U.S. to build a well-designed 10 seat toilet block with pour-flush systems) the fact remains that to tackle this problem requires massive expenditures. For example, in Mumbai almost 2000 such blocks would need to be built to cover slum dwellers who, as of now, haven't access to proper facilities at all. Using the official exchange rate, the total costs would therefore be over one and a half million dollars U.S. (and in terms of purchasing power parity almost $8 million U.S.). Regardless of the cost, management of various charities and NGOs of 2000 such projects along with the competition for money as these organizations work independently of one another implies a high degree of inefficiency. Yet along with the decided apathy that exists due to government focusing mostly on the interests of the well-to-do and the powerful there is the issue of government inefficiency. Burra, Patel, and Kerr make a strong case for being more than a bit skeptical about the ability of municipal governments being at all efficient. One Alliance study cited in their article shows that contractors have routinely built substandard toilet blocks.** Inadequate water supplies in particular mean that often in as little as three months latrines become so blocked and dirty that they become unusable. This couple with builders asking community members for more money as toilet blocks are being built in their neighborhoods and the city charging unrealistically high fees for access (Rs150 for a family of five would allow each family member to use the facilities once a day) suggests that perhaps community based initiatives, given political realities, are on balance a better alternative. ** See Robert Wade_Governing the Market_ pages 288-289. Contrasting corruption in Taiwan to corruption in India he notes that in East Asia: "Most rumored or reported corruption takes place at the local and provincial government levels where nothing major for the national development effort is at stake ... In all these ways corruption contrasts with corruption in many other countries in South and Southeast Asia. Corruption on public works projects, for example, occurs mainly through overcharging for correctly built structures. In India it occurs mainly by substandard construction of correctly priced structures, which are much more likely to wash out in the next monsoon. Taiwan's mode is probably less damaging to economic development than India's".Thursday, September 27, 2007
More public support for higher education
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
The G.I. Bill
Friday, September 14, 2007
socioeconomic standing and access to higher education
He outlines several very recent programs at flagship public universities such as UVA, the University of Texas, and UNC-Chapel Hill to increase enrollment of students from low-income families as well as very recent efforts by Princeton (1998), Harvard (2005), and Yale (2006) to increase enrollment rates and graduation rates of students from low-income families. Very selective schools by definition admit and graduate mostly students from wealthier families. Hill, Winston, and Boyd ("Affordability: Family Incomes and Net Prices at Highly Selective Private Colleges and Universities" Journal of Human Resources, 40 (fall 2005)) note that 108,721 students earned undergraduate degrees at the 28 highly selective private colleges and universities in their study. This implies that well under 10% of all the students earning bachelor's degrees in spring of 2002 received their degrees from such schools. Given the cost of attending such institutions, one can safely assume that families of relatively modest means were receiving some sort of financial aid. Assuming that all middle class and low-income families attending these schools received some kind of aid, students from families earning less than $51,000 a year represented only 17% of students graduating from such schools.
To make these very exclusive schools more inclusive is fine. However, students from wealthy families are disproportionately represented in these schools and always will be. Besides this, as noted above only a small percent of college graduates in a given year earn their degrees from such institutions. Therefore changes here cannot be expected to create more than a ripple overall. What is needed are similar programs at the colleges and universities where the majority of students pursue their education. However as Ehrenberg points out there is a danger in such institutions being more inclusive because these "lesser" colleges and universities face even more risk -both financially and politically- if they follow suit.
The financial resources of such schools are far more limited. As Hill,Winston, and Boyd (in the study of highly selective private colleges and universities already mentioned above) note there is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the net price students from low-income families are asked to pay for their schooling and the size of the endowment per student a particular school has. In the case of schools with much lower endowments per student Ehrenberg notes that they "...do not have the large flow of annual giving and the large endowments that the University of Virginia or the University of Chapel Hill have and thus it will be more difficult for them to develop the resources necessary to support programs such as Access UVA or the Carolina Covenant."
He goes on to point out that "If these flagship institutions are successful in diversifying their student bodies along racial/ethnic and socioeconomic lines, they run the risk of alienating the traditional supporters of their institutions; the upper and middle class families whose children attend high school that have been large feeders schools for them. This may translate into political pressure to reverse policies that led to the diversification, or a further loss of financial support for the public institutions." (Ehrenberg, p. 14). Other schools face the same political problem if students from the families that have typically supported these schools have a more difficult time being admitted into these schools because equally or more deserving students from poorer families have taken their place.
Therefore the current efforts that are being made to make access to higher education more equitable are likely to have less impact than one would hope for or what is needed to really change the way opportunity is distributed. A few cards in the deck are being moved around and most of the aces are still at the top. The entire deck needs to be reshuffled.
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
Housing prices and news coverage of the subprime crisis.
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Microfinance
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
the insanity of college rankings
Thursday, August 16, 2007
personal savings, consumer debt and subprime mortgages
Consumer credit:
Isn't it still true that the average American family carries massive amounts of debt? Without question we do. Looking at figures from 1953 to the present the ratio of household liabilities to personal income has grown significantly. But this simply means that we spend now and save later. Our savings take the form of interest payments and payment of principal on the funds we have already borrowed. We save ex post (after the fact) not ex ante (before the fact). This debt is part of the price we pay for enjoying goods and services sooner rather than later and it does carry with it certain risks. Our ability to retire this debt is senstive to the rate of interest charged, the total amount we have borrowed, and what happens to our earnings. If I use my credit card to make major purchases, the more I charge to this card, the higher the interest rate attached to this credit and the lower my income is as I pay back this debt, the larger the share of my earnings I must commit to paying interest and the original amount charged if I am to retire this debt any time soon. The temptation to delay this final day of reckoning and the almost inevitable need to so as unexpected expenses come up means that for many individual families the burden can grow to be considerable. We may in fact long for the mythical days when to buy something one had to build up cash reserves over time. In this case, in the event of a broken windshield and $100 deductible to cover or hundreds of dollars in plumbing bills, one could draw on these balances and simply delay further the major purchase originally planned.
The moral virtues of delayed graitifaction aside, the real advantage of "saving-up" for something then is the flexibility is provides. The temptation of simply putting off payment, the risk of rising rate being charged on balances you still owe and the financially precarious position one faces having amassed such debt if their earnings decline are the real reaons to be concerned about consumer credit. The personal advanatges of controlling spending and using this money to make extra payments on the mortgage, on car loans, and on credit cards are very real. And a shift from the buy now/pay later mentality that easy access to consumer credit makes possible would provide the sort of freedom of manouevre already discussed. However, these actions will weaken the financial position of businesses accustomed to the trade of such familes. As their revenues fall, given costs, profits and cash flow will decline. It is this a very fundamental fallacy to reason from the individual advantages of higher savings that it will be socially advantageous. Reduced spending will free resources that could be used for more investment. However, since saving in the aggregate will not increase -increased personal saving leads to reduced business saving- the rate of interest will not fall. And the degree to which these businesses rely on cash flow to honr their debts, any belt tightening by households will simply push the burden on to the business sector. At any rate, although we obviously save today so that we will have the power to spend sometime in the future we have only the vaguest ideas of what form exactly this spending will takeor when it will take place. As a result, assuming they could somehow raise the funds to employ investible resources, businesses contemplating investment are left to themselves to decide what fraction of the resources available they should employ and in what direction they should employ them. Subprime mortgages: It is interesting to go back to comments made by Greenspan in 2004 regarding what we now refer to as the subprime market. He pointed to advances in computer technology that made it easier to identify good credit risks out of the pool of low income borrowers. In particular he was referring to the automated underwriting systems such as Freddie Mac's Loan Prospector (see a, b, c, d). These systems promised to make it possible to extend credit to many who otherwise might be denied mortgage credit under traditional underwriting. With automatic underwriting systems to screen applicants (and separate the wheat from the chaff high credit risk borrowers from lower risk ones) Freddie Mac claimed in 1996 to have reduced such costs by on average $350 to $600 per loan (a) (For claims made more recently that it is has been reduced by over $900 see b). As a result of such technologies, lenders- anxious to mine a previously untapped vein of borrowers and to tap a market where the rates charged typically were 2% points higher than a prime mortgage for the same amount would be- aggressively begain issuing mortgages to economically poorer families with less of an estiablished credit history in more depressed areas. Banks increasingly originated variable rate mortgages to low income families to purchase modest homes. According to one source, last year in 2006 20% of all mortgages granted were to subprime borrowers. The social benefits of subprime lending are that home ownership rates have risen from 65% of the population to 69% with 12 million new homeowners and approximaltely half from racial minorities (see a and b) Greater competition among banks for the business of higher income families with proven credit histories and buying expensive homes meant that potentially greater returns could be obtained by those moving into the subprime market. The securitization of such mortgages meant that there was money to be made through fees paid to the banks that originated these mortgages and the pooling of such loans into firms specializing in subprime mortgages meant that the risks could be spread out among a large number of investors. Lending to lower income families at variable rates of interest is one thing when jobs are relatively plentiful and market interest rates are low. It is quite another matter when higher interest rates are targetted and weakness in the overall economy (or specific sectors such as construction and the automobile industry) and the housing market caused in part by higher interest rates are coupled with competition from abroad, immigrant labor and computerization reduce employment opportunities and growth in earnings. Also, unlike prime mortgages, subprime mortgages more often than not carry substantial prepayment penaltie. Typically they were set up in such a way that they were more than viable in an economy with low interest rates, easy refinancing, and rising house prices but carried, as we can now see, a considerable amount of downside risk. Were lenders who originated these mortgages, the companies that bought them, and the borrowers blind to these risks? Probably in the case of many borrowers yes. Less financially savvy, eager to buy their own home, and trusting the authority of bankers and mortgage brokers they have workers with, they focused on the initial terms of the mortgage and were reassured that later on they had little to worry about. What is chilling is how little attention is being paid to 1 million plus families who are expected to go into default this year and therefore who will face foreclosure. Equally chilling is that the many families who were misled, given the complexities and layering of these securitized mortgages, have a far more daunting task if they wish to complain of consumer fraud than if this were a more traditional mortgage both issued and held by the bank that set up the mortgage(See Kiff and Mills). In the case of the bankers, mortgage brokers, and investors who provided the demand for subprime mortgages, rather than being blind to these downside risks they have rightly assumed that downside risks would be shared and, if lucky, the lion's share of the burden would be borne by others. Many involved in the formerly lucrative business of originating subprime mortgages are leaving both the families they lent money to and the investors who bought these mortgages from them to twist in the wind. That the focus has been on the latter group and the much more economically and financially significant repercussion of their difficulties is shameful. The real victims are those who have lost their homes and suffered the embarassment of default. Should the Fed and other central banks intervened as they have? Consider what the root causes of this crisis are. Many subprime mortgages start with the first two, three, or five years at low fixed rates and then change over to variable rate loans. The rates charged on variable rate loans may be a high as a full five percent over LIBOR. In addition to income and a borrower's debt service ratio, the feasibility of refinancing will depend on the ratio of the amount of money that must be borrowed to retire the old debt and convert it into a new mortgage relative to the value of the home. With prepayment penalities and stagnant or falling home prices the amount to be borrowed climbs as well as the loan to value ratio rises. First lax regulation by the Fed and other regulatory bodies allowed banks to become increasingly cavalier about credit risk. Second, Fed policy since 2004 has been to tighten credit and push interest rates higher. The fed funds rate stands over 4% points higher than it was in June 2004. Fed monetary restraint, whatever the intention, in turn has contributed to the fall in the U.S. housing market. All of this has made payment of existing mortgages or refinancing difficult if not impossible for subprime borrowers. This crisis, like the foreign/Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s or the Dot.com bust of the late 1990s, is therefore due to no small degree to shifts in Fed policy. Since the current crisis is in part the Fed's doing, it is only right therefore that the Fed do something. I am little concerned that specualtors will come to expect the Fed to bail out markets when they falter significantly and therefore become more reckless still. It seems few involved with Fed policy understand how often in recent years they are simply being forced to offset the harmful effects of the sort of stop/go cycle that constitutes modern monetary policy. If Fed officials fail to discern this pattern why should one expect private investors, with a much narrower and a shorter time horizon, to see one? Since Hyman Minksy, inspired by Irving Fisher and Michal Kalecki, wrote about these issues in the 1960s and 1970s we have understood that the price we pay for a robust growing economy is the sort of excesses that we are seeing now. The Fed has again shown its incredible knack for tapping on the brakes just as we are starting to climb up a very steep hill. What is regrettable is how little attention is given to the low income homeowners being crushed under the wheels of our economic machine as it rolls backwards.